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INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have long noted the importance of
bail before trial in allowing the effective preparation of a defense,
protecting the falsely accused from the extremely unpleasant and
disruptive experience of being jailed, and maintaining the pre-
sumption of innocence.1  Indeed, the Framers considered bail suffi-
ciently important to merit inclusion in the Bill of Rights.  The
Eighth Amendment reads, in part, “Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired.”2  The Excessive Bail Clause, however, has been called
“some of the most ambiguous language in the Bill of Rights,” and
has occasioned a great deal of debate among jurists and scholars.3
This debate has focused largely on two questions: whether the
Clause binds only the courts or Congress as well, and whether it
creates any substantive right to bail.4
These questions finally came directly before the Supreme Court
in a constitutional challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the
1. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of
Detention:  Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 404
(1970) [hereinafter Tribe, An Ounce of Detention].
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (Part I), 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 969 (1965).
4. Perhaps because of this uncertainty, the Supreme Court has only indirectly
applied the Excessive Bail Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (dictum), cited in Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo
Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1248 (2002).  The Court’s ex-
tremely restrictive interpretation in United States v. Salerno has made this question
largely moot. See infra Part IV.B.
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first federal statute to allow the denial of bail for dangerousness.5
In United States v. Salerno, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for five
other members of the Court, strongly suggested that the Excessive
Bail Clause limits only the discretion of the judiciary and found, at
a maximum, an extremely attenuated substantive right to bail.6
There has been relatively little innovation in the law and scholar-
ship on bail in the twenty years since Salerno, and without renewed
consideration of the core purpose embodied in the Excessive Bail
Clause, the Clause will continue to be little more than empty verbi-
age.  This Article argues that the Excessive Bail Clause, while
granting no substantive right to bail, protects criminal defendants
from governmental discrimination and coercion—protections that
are eviscerated by the Bail Reform Act of 1984.  Part I will provide
a brief history of the Excessive Bail Clause.  Part II will examine
the interpretation of the Clause prior to Salerno.  Part III will look
at the procedures of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, and Part IV will
discuss Salerno’s analysis of the Act.  Part V will describe how the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 fails to comport with the core constitu-
tional purpose of the Excessive Bail Clause.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE OF THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Although the history of bail in the Anglo-American system ex-
tends back to the Statute of Westminster I in 1275,7 which dictated
which offenses were bailable,8 and even further to the earliest be-
5. See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3156 (2006)); infra Part IV.  While this Article fo-
cuses solely on bail and the Eighth Amendment, preventive detention also raises im-
portant due process questions which have been widely debated before and after
Salerno. See, e.g., Albert A. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure
of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986);
Hermine H. Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (Part II), 60 GEO. L.J. 1381
(1972); Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75
MINN. L. REV. 335 (1990); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 1. R
6. 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987); see discussion infra Part IV.B.
7. See Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE
STATUTES AT LARGE, IN PARAGRAPHS, AND SECTIONS OR NUMBERS, FROM MAGNA
CHARTA, TO THE END OF THE SESSION OF PARLIAMENT, MARCH 14, 1704, IN THE
FOURTH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF HER MAJESTY QUEEN ANNE (London, Cambridge
Univ. 1706) [hereinafter THE STATUTES AT LARGE 1704].
8. See William F. Duker, The Right to Bail:  A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV.
33, 45-46 (1977).  This statute was aimed at curbing the abuse of bail by sheriffs and
other local officials rather than by royal judges, but nonetheless became an important
statutory right in the conflict between the Stuarts and Parliament over imprisonment
without cause shown or bail granted.
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ginnings of criminal justice in England, the origins of the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause can be more narrowly traced
to the seventeenth century.9  The struggle between the Stuart
monarchs and Parliament led to three landmark pieces of legisla-
tion curtailing the exercise of royal prerogative and safeguarding
individual rights:  the Petition of Right in 1628,10 followed by the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,11 and, finally, the English Bill of
Rights in 1689,12 which contains the “excessive bail ought not to be
required” phrasing that, in modified form and after appearing in
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, appears in the U.S. Bill of
Rights.13  This section will trace the history of the Excessive Bail
Clause from its English roots to its inclusion in the Bill of Rights
before examining, for context, other bail provisions of colonial and
Revolutionary America.
A. The Petition of Right
The Petition of Right of 1628 was a Parliamentary response to
the King’s asserted royal power to jail his subjects without showing
cause.  The unpopular Charles I, after failing to obtain funding
from the Parliament of 1626 for his support of the King of France’s
efforts to repress French Protestant rebels, collected dues and de-
manded mandatory loans from his subjects.14  In what has become
commonly known as Darnel’s Case, five knights were imprisoned
by royal command after refusing to make the imposed loan.15
Counsel for the defense sought, among other relief, release on bail
through habeas corpus, arguing that “since the five knights stood
9. For accounts of the earlier history of bail in England, see ELSA DE HAAS,
ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL:  ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES
TO THE YEAR 1275 (1940); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAIS-
SANCE:  ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE (1974); Duker, supra note 8. R
10. Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car. 1, c. 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE, FROM THE THIRTY-NINTH YEAR OF QUEEN ELIZABETH, TO THE TWELFTH
YEAR OF KING CHARLES II INCLUSIVE (London, Cambridge Univ. 1763) [hereinafter
THE STATUTES AT LARGE 1763].
11. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in THE STATUTES AT
LARGE, FROM THE TWELFTH YEAR OF KING CHARLES II TO THE LAST YEAR OF
KING JAMES II INCLUSIVE (London, Cambridge Univ. 1763) [hereinafter THE STAT-
UTES AT LARGE JAMES II].
12. English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE STAT-
UTES AT LARGE 1704, supra note 7, at 1555.
13. See discussion infra Part I.D.
14. See Duker, supra note 8, at 58. R
15. Proceedings on the Habeas Corpus, brought by Sir Thomas Darnel, Sir John
Corbet, Sir Walter Earl, Sir John Heveningham, and Sir Edmund Hampden, at the
King’s-bench in Westminster-hall, reprinted in 3 COBBETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION
OF STATE TRIALS 2 (London, R. Bagshaw 1809) [hereinafter Darnel’s Case].
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accused but not convicted, they should be freed on bail.”16  If not,
Sergeant Bramston, attorney for one of the knights, argued, the
protections of English criminal procedure would be worthless
against the King, and his client’s “imprisonment [would] not con-
tinue on for a time, but for ever; and the subjects of this kingdom
may be restrained of their liberties perpetually.”17  Bail, in and of
itself, was not the main issue in Darnel’s Case; rather it was “the
discretionary power of the crown to imprison its subjects without
notice of the cause”18 and the use of this power to target the King’s
political and religious opponents.  The court, accepting the argu-
ment of the Attorney General, “ruled that the King (in the inter-
ests of preserving the state) had legal power to commit a person
without showing cause.”19  Further, without cause “the court had
no basis for judgment: it could not question the royal right to com-
mit, nor could it grant bail.”20  As the court put it, “the King hath
done it, and we trust him in great matters.”21
This decision angered many, and Parliament took up the issue in
the following year, resulting in the Petition of Right.22  The Peti-
tion, referring to Darnel’s Case, asked that “no freeman, in any
manner as before mentioned, be imprisoned or detained.”23  As
Professor Caleb Foote notes, Parliament was aware during the de-
bates over the Petition of the negative implications of the royal
power of arrest without cause for statutory guarantees of pretrial
release:
[T]here was repeated discussion of the fact that, if the decision
in Darnel’s Case stood, it would impair the effectiveness of the
Statute of Westminster the First of 127524 which governed ad-
mission to bail; thus Coke stated that “the cause of imprison-
ment must be known, else the statute will be of little force
. . . .”25
16. LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 1689, at 89 (1981).
17. Darnel’s Case, supra note 15, at 8. R
18. Hermine H. Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (Part I), 60 GEO.
L.J. 1139, 1182 (1972) (citing 6 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 32–40 (1927)).
19. SCHWOERER, supra note 16 (internal citations omitted). R
20. Id. (internal citations omitted).
21. Darnel’s Case, supra note 15.
22. SCHWOERER, supra note 16. R
23. Darnel’s Case, supra note 15.
24. Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE STAT-
UTES AT LARGE  1704, supra note 7.
25. Foote, supra note 3, at 966-67 (quoting 3 How. St. Tr. at 69). R
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ105.txt unknown Seq: 6 28-JAN-09 13:20
126 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI
The protection of the Petition of Right against the Crown’s
power to use the criminal justice system against his enemies was
limited, however, while the King still had a prerogative court like
that of the Star Chamber.  Parliament abolished this court in 1641
and in the same act26 provided:  that any subject imprisoned on
royal authority would have a writ of habeas corpus from the Court
of King’s Bench or Common Pleas; that the jailer would then have
to return to the court the true cause of imprisonment within three
days and that the court would then be required within three days to
deliver, bail, or remand the prisoner.27  Both the Petition of Right
and the Act of 1641 proved procedurally inadequate to protect in-
dividuals from imprisonment at the King’s discretion, leading Par-
liament to pass the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.
B. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
In the years before the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act, both
Oliver Cromwell and Charles II were able to imprison individuals
without showing cause by exploiting procedural weaknesses in the
existing laws, which did not cover persons imprisoned by order of
the Secretary of State, persons whose cases had not yet been calen-
dared by the jailer, or persons imprisoned outside of the jurisdic-
tion of the court.28  The Crown’s exploitation of procedural
loopholes to keep London alderman Francis Jenkes imprisoned in
1676 after his arrest for sedition—resulting from a speech in which
he called for Parliament to be assembled29—is an oft-cited example
of the abuses that spurred Parliament to pass the Habeas Corpus
Act three years later.  In that Act, Parliament noted its concern
over these denials of bail, noting, “many of the King’s subjects
have been and hereafter may be long detained in prison, in such
cases where by law they are bailable.”30
This Act was successful in strengthening the writ of habeas
corpus and closing the procedural gaps in the preceding legislation,
26. Act of 1641, 1641, 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (Eng.), reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE 1763, supra note 10.
27. See 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 115 (1926); see
also ANTHONY HIGHMORE, A DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINE OF BAIL 214 (Dublin 1791).
28. See SCHWOERER, supra note 16, at 89–90; Duker, supra note 8, at 65. R
29. Proceedings Against Mr. Francis Jenkes, for a Speech Made by Him on the
Hustings, at Guildhall, in the City of London, on Midsummer-day, reprinted in 6 COB-
BETT’S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1189 (London, R. Bagshaw 1810)
[hereinafter Jenkes’s Case].
30. Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in THE STATUTES AT
LARGE JAMES II, supra note 11; see also SCHWOERER, supra note 16, at 90; Duker, R
supra note 8, at 64–65; Foote, supra note 3, at 967. R
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but nonetheless failed to completely curb the abuses it sought to
remedy:  the royal judges were able to literally comply with the Act
yet still deprive royally-accused defendants of their liberty before
trial by deliberately setting bail so high that the defendants could
not pay.31  Using the device of “excessive bail, the judges had made
the Habeas Corpus Act inoperative with respect to those prisoners
whom the King did not want to release.”32  This, then, led Parlia-
ment to include a prohibition against excessive bail in the English
Bill of Rights of 1689.
C. The Excessive Bail Clause of the English Bill of Rights
As it became clear that royal judges were using the device of
unattainably high bail to thwart the spirit of the Petition of Right
and the Habeas Corpus Act, Parliament moved towards a solution:
“In December 1680, a committee of the House of Commons ap-
pointed to examine the proceedings of the judges in Westminster
Hall brought in a report condemning as ‘illegal and a high breach
of the liberty of the subject’ the refusing of ‘sufficient’ bail.”33
Seven members of this committee also went on to sit on the rights
committee in 1689,34 and the tenth clause of the Bill of Rights
signed by the newly enthroned William and Mary contained the
familiar formula:  “That excessive Bail ought not to be required,
nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments
inflicted.”35  Thus, although in a larger sense directed at the sover-
eign, the excessive bail clause of the English Bill of Rights oper-
ated in practice against the judges who had colluded with the
Stuarts in holding royal prisoners without trial or bail.  This, then,
was the origin of the clause that, in a slightly altered form, crossed
the Atlantic and was incorporated into colonial and state law.
D. Inclusion in the Bill of Rights
The excessive bail clause of the English Bill of Rights, after be-
ing adopted in several state constitutions, entered the U.S. Bill of
Rights with little debate.  Although there had been many colonial
laws concerning bail,36 the excessive bail language from the English
31. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 118–19; SCHWOERER, supra note 16, at 90. R
32. Meyer, supra note 18, at 1189. R
33. SCHWOERER, supra note 16, at 90 (quoting 9 H.C. Jour. 692 (1680)). R
34. See id. (citing 9 H.C. Jour. 661 (1680)).
35. English Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE STAT-
UTES AT LARGE 1704, supra note 7, at 1555.
36. For a thorough account of bail in Colonial America, see Duker, supra note 8, R
at 77–81.
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Bill of Rights first appeared in America in June 1776, when the
Virginia Legislature adopted it verbatim in the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights.37  Similar wording was subsequently adopted in the
revolutionary era constitutions of several other states.38  While rati-
fying the Constitution, several states urged the adoption of a prohi-
bition against excessive bail as part of a bill of rights, and when
James Madison proposed amendments in the House of Represent-
atives in 1789, he included, with the substitution of “shall” for
“ought,” the prohibition against excessive bail (as well as excessive
fines and cruel and unusual punishment) from the English Bill of
Rights and the Declaration of Rights of his home state.39
However much congressional debate surrounded passage of the
Eighth Amendment, very little of this debate is recorded.  The only
known remark addressing the proposed Excessive Bail Clause
came from Mr. Livermore in the House of Representatives as part
of a comment on the Eighth Amendment as a whole.  In only a few
words, he presaged the difficult question of interpretation that the
Supreme Court would address almost 200 years later in Salerno:
“The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no mean-
ing in it, I do not think it necessary.  What is meant by the terms
excessive bail? Who are to be the judges?”40 Unfortunately, this
comment apparently sparked no further debate, and a large major-
ity subsequently approved the amendment.41  The Representatives
may have declined to address Mr. Livermore’s concerns because
they knew exactly what the Clause meant but could not be both-
ered to explain it.  Alternatively, some, like Mr. Livermore, might
not have known the precise meaning of the Clause but also did not
object to it on account of its “humanity.”  Or perhaps they had
entirely different reasons.  Without more evidence, however, the
explanations for this lack of debate are a matter of pure
speculation.
E. Other Bail Provisions in Early America
The excessive bail clause from the English Bill of Rights was,
perhaps unsurprisingly, not the only strand of English bail law to
37. See Foote, supra note 3, at 983. R
38. See id.
39. Id.; see also Duker, supra note 8, at 83–84. R
40. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834), re-
printed in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 377 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987).
41. Foote, supra note 3, at 986. R
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influence colonial and revolutionary drafters:  the Statute of West-
minster I42 and other English statutory provisions, as well as the
common law as it had developed, were also important, and were
adapted for use in colonial, state, and federal laws.43  The Frame of
Government of Pennsylvania of 1682—seven years before the pas-
sage of the English Bill of Rights—provided in section XI of the
Laws Agreed Upon in England “[t]hat all prisoners shall be baila-
ble by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, where the
proof is evident, or the presumption great.”44  The following year,
this provision served as the pattern for the bail provision in the
New York Charter of Liberties and Privileges of 1683, which reads,
in part, “[that] in all cases whatsoever Bayle by sufficient Suretyes
Shall be allowed and taken unlesse for treason or felony plainly
and specially Expressed and menconed in the warrant of
Committment.”45
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682 also served as a
model for the Northwest Ordinance passed by the Continental
Congress in 1787,46 which provided that “[a]ll persons shall be bail-
able, unless for capital offenses, where the proof shall be evident or
the presumption great.  All fines shall be moderate; and no cruel or
unusual punishments shall be inflicted.”47  This ordinance is espe-
cially interesting because, as Professor Foote notes, while its bail
provision is taken from the Pennsylvania law, its prohibitions
against immoderate fines and cruel or unusual punishments are
adapted from the English Bill of Rights.48  Foote speculates that
the drafter, an experienced lawyer, may have concluded that de-
claring all persons bailable “included by necessary implication the
requirement that bail be reasonable.”49  Whatever the precise mo-
tivation for combining the two strands of bail law in this way, they
were both incorporated—this time unmixed—into the law of the
42. Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE STAT-
UTES AT LARGE 1704, supra note 7.
43. For a more comprehensive account of early American bail laws, see Duker,
supra note 8, at 77–83. R
44. Meyer, supra note 18, at 1163 (quoting 5 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL R
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3052, 3061 (1909)).
45. Meyer, supra note 18, at 1163 (quoting 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTI- R
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 95 (1906)).
46. Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1787).
47. Id. art. 2, at 52.
48. Foote, supra note 3, at 987.  See the discussion of Professor Foote’s interpreta- R
tion of the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause, Part II.C.2, infra.
49. Foote, supra note 3, at 987.
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new republic two years later with the passage of the Bill of Rights
and the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789.
As we have already seen, the Excessive Bail Clause of the
United States Bill of Rights is borrowed more or less directly from
its English counterpart.  In contrast, the Judiciary Act, though it
was before the House when debate began on the proposed consti-
tutional amendments,50 contains no trace of the language adopted
100 years earlier in the English Bill of Rights.  It has, instead, less
ambiguous language:
And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted,
except where the punishment may be death, in which cases it
shall not be admitted but by the supreme or a circuit court, or by
a justice of the supreme court, or a judge of a district court, who
shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and
circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and the us-
ages of law.51
Although the wording has been altered and the subject matter
expanded, the Judiciary Act’s bail provision clearly has its roots in
the Westminster Statute/Pennsylvania Frame of Government line
of Anglo-American bail law.
These, then, in brief form, are the origins of the Excessive Bail
Clause of the Eighth Amendment and other sources of federal bail
law through the adoption of the Bill of Rights. Even simplified and
abbreviated, it is a somewhat complex and obscure history.  This
complexity, combined with the Clause’s extreme brevity, has made
consensus over the precise function of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against excessive bail elusive.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE
BEFORE SALERNO
Although there was some difference of opinion, before the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Salerno a majority of courts and com-
mentators believed that bail was excessive within the meaning of
the Eighth Amendment when set at “an amount beyond that nec-
essary to secure appearance.”52  There was no such agreement,
50. Duker, supra note 8, at 85. R
51. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3141 (2006)).
52. Duker, supra note 8, at 90 (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) and R
collecting cases); see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1948 (Melville M. Bigelow, ed., 5th ed. Little, Brown 1891)
(“An accused party is always to be  presumed innocent until proved guilty; and
though he may be arrested and detained until investigation can be had, he is neverthe-
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however, about whether the Excessive Bail Clause binds only the
courts and leaves the legislature a completely free hand, or
whether it binds Congress as well.  A further debate among mod-
ern commentators centers on whether the Clause creates a substan-
tive right to bail, and, if so,53 what is the scope of this putative right.
A. Early Commentators
Not reaching the question of a right to bail, early constitutional
scholars were divided on the issue of whether the Excessive Bail
Clause binds the legislature, as can be seen by examining two
prominent nineteenth century treatises published only a few years
apart.  In the first, William Rawle’s A View of the Constitution of
the United States, the passage on the Excessive Bail Clause suggests
that the author considered the Clause to be effective only against
the courts:
During the arbitrary reigns of the Stuarts in Britain, particularly
of the two last, one frequent mode of oppressing those who
were obnoxious to the court, was to cause criminal proceedings
to be instituted against them, to demand bail in extravagant
sums, and on their failing to procure it, to commit them to
prison.
When the revolution took place, among other provisions de-
manded by the people, and readily assented to by William III
was the clause which has been transcribed into this amendment.
If excessive bail is demanded by one magistrate, another may
less entitled, in all except capital cases, to choose his keepers if he shall give sufficient
security that they shall produce him at the proper time for trial.  Excessive bail must,
therefore, not be required; and the just import of this is, that only sufficient should be
demanded to render the production of the accused for trial reasonably certain.”) (em-
phasis added); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 1, at 400–01.  There is, how- R
ever, a debate in the pre-Salerno courts and in the literature over whether
dangerousness is a proper factor to consider when setting bail. See, e.g., Alschuler,
supra note 5; John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial De- R
tention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 1. R
However, since the argument is not made that demanding a greater sum would deter
defendants from committing crimes while released on bail except by keeping them in
jail for lack of funds, detention for dangerousness will be analyzed herein as a denial
of bail.  See, e.g., Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (W.D. Va. 1972) (“While the
right to bail is guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment, neither this amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment require that everyone charged with a crime be released on
bail pending his trial. . . . A trial judge may deny bail if he feels that the release of the
accused will endanger the community.”).
53. Adherents of this view would presumably also hold the Excessive Bail Clause
operative against the Executive branch were it in a position to set bail.
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moderate it on a habeas corpus, issued to the keeper of the
prison in whose custody the party is.54
The author’s treatment of the application of the Excessive Fines
Clause in the subsequent paragraphs provides contrast:
This restriction [against excessive fines] applies equally to the
legislative and to the judicial authority.  In respect to the former,
however, it is rather to be considered in the light of a recom-
mendation than as a condition on which the constitutionality of
the law depends.  The judicial authority would not undertake to
pronounce a law void, because the fine it imposed appeared to
them excessive; and, therefore, if the legislature should commit,
and persist in, gross errors in this respect, the ultimate remedy
must be sought among the checks on the legislative power . . . .55
Thus, for Rawle, while the Excessive Fines Clause “applies
equally” to Congress and the courts, at least in the form of a sug-
gestion, the Bail Clause operates only against the judicial branch.
Justice Joseph Story’s account of the Clause in Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States, however, takes the opposite
position.  According to Story, the English predecessors of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail imposed
limitations on Parliament as well as the Crown and the royal
judges:
In England, the bills of rights were not demanded merely of the
crown, as withdrawing a power from the royal prerogative; they
were equally important, as withdrawing power from parliament.
A large proportion of the most valuable of the provisions in
Magna Charta, and the bill of rights in 1688, consists of a solemn
recognition, of limitations upon the power of parliament; that is,
a declaration, that parliament ought not to abolish, or restrict
those rights.  Such are the right of trial by jury; the right to per-
sonal liberty and private property according to the law of the
land . . . . and that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments
inflicted.56
Whatever the historical merits of Justice Story’s view of the ef-
fectiveness of the English Bill of Rights against Parliament, it is
important as a reflection of early thought on the origins of the
54. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
130–32 (2d ed. 1829), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at R
387.
55. Id.
56. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1858 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray 1833).
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Eighth Amendment, and it clearly influenced Story’s account of
the Excessive Bail Clause:
The provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free
government, since it is scarcely possible, that any department of
such a government should authorize, or justify such atrocious
conduct. It was, however, adopted, as an admonition to all de-
partments of the national government, to warn them against
such violent proceedings, as had taken place in England in the
arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts.  In those times, a de-
mand of excessive bail was often made against persons, who
were odious to the court, and its favourites; and on failing to
procure it, they were committed to prison.  Enormous fines and
amercements were also sometimes imposed, and cruel and vin-
dictive punishments inflicted.57
According to Justice Story, then, the Excessive Bail Clause was,
at the least, “an admonition” to all branches of the new govern-
ment.  While his account of the English Bill of Rights suggests that
he may well have considered the Eighth Amendment to limit the
power of the legislature, he does not say that this admonition cre-
ated any substantive right to bail.
As we have seen, there was already disagreement over the
proper application of the Excessive Bail Clause by the 1830s.  This
difference of opinion was not limited to scholars, but extended to
the courts as well.
B. Pre-Salerno Court decisions
Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Salerno, both advocates
and opponents of finding a limit on Congress and a substantive
right to bail in the Excessive Bail Clause could find support from
the courts.58  This support included dicta from a pair of early 1950s
Supreme Court decisions.
1. Stack v. Boyle
In Stack v. Boyle,59 the petitioners, charged under the Smith
Act,60 challenged their bail, which had been set at $50,000, as ex-
cessive under the Eighth Amendment.  Because petitioners had a
statutory right to bail, the Court did not need to consider whether
57. Id. § 1896.
58. See Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 1, at 399 nn.117–18 (collecting R
cases).
59. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
60. Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 670-76 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2385 (2006).
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the Excessive Bail Clause created any right to bail under the Con-
stitution.  Nonetheless, the Court observed that the “traditional
right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered prepa-
ration of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punish-
ment prior to conviction.  Unless this right to bail before trial is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centu-
ries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”61  While certainly not con-
clusive, this statement suggests the Supreme Court considered the
right to bail to be protected by the Constitution.  Only a few
months later, however, the Court reversed its dicta course.
2. Carlson v. Landon
In Carlson, a 5-4 majority found that alien communists facing
deportation could be denied bail.62  In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Reed, writing for the Court, suggested that the Excessive
Bail Clause applies only to the judiciary and affords no right to
bail.  The Court first noted that:
[t]he bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English
Bill of Rights Act.  In England that clause has never been
thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to pro-
vide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is
proper to grant bail.63
The Court went on to add:  “[t]he Eighth Amendment has not
prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail
shall be allowed in this country. . . . Indeed, the very language of
the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable.”64  Despite
the Court’s eagerness to comment on the issue, however, Carlson
was a civil case, and its actual holding was limited to its particular
statutory circumstances.65  Thus, at the Supreme Court level, the
issue of whether the Excessive Bail Clause applies to Congress and
creates a constitutional right to bail rested until Salerno.
61. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (internal citation omitted).
62. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
63. Id. at 545.
64. Id. at 545-46 (internal citations omitted).
65. See id. at 546 (“We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not
require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases.”).
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C. Modern Scholarly Opinion Before Salerno
The Excessive Bail Clause became a focus of scholarly interest66
in the 1960s as a result of the possibilities created by the Supreme
Court’s new authority over state criminal procedure through the
doctrine of incorporation.  Congressional interest in preventive de-
tention measures, beginning with the Nixon administration’s pro-
posal in 1969, created further interest.67  Much of the resulting
debate focused on whether the Clause creates a substantive right to
bail and, if so, the extent of that right.  Three main positions devel-
oped68 and will be explored here:  (1) that the Excessive Bail
Clause binds only the courts and imparts no substantive right to
bail; (2) that the Clause binds Congress as well and grants a right to
bail in all noncapital cases; and (3) that the Clause binds Congress
as well and grants a right to bail when pretrial imprisonment is not
necessary to protect the government’s interest in prosecuting the
defendant.
1. The Argument that the Excessive Bail Clause Binds Only the
Courts and Grants No Right to Bail
Put forth by, among others, Nixon Attorney General John
Mitchell;69 Hermine Meyer, an attorney in the Office of the Dep-
uty Attorney General under Nixon; and William Duker, this histor-
ically based argument is essentially that of the Court’s Carlson v.
Landon dictum.  The Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment is based on the similar clause in the English Bill of Rights, the
argument goes, and the English clause did not itself grant a right to
bail; rather it merely prevented judges from circumventing bail
rights granted by other provisions of law.70  Further, the Framers
were “familiar with English law and English legal history,”71 and
intentionally replicated the structure of the English bail safeguards
by including “the excessive bail clause to prevent obstruction of the
Habeas Corpus Act in the eighth amendment.”72
66. See, e.g., RONALD GOLDFARB, RANSOM:  A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN
BAIL SYSTEM (1965); Foote, supra note 3; Mitchell, supra note 52; Tribe, An Ounce of R
Detention, supra note 1. R
67. 27 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 238 (Feb. 7, 1969).  Nixon’s preventive detention
proposal is, in many ways, the direct ancestor of the Bail Reform Act, and the two
have many common features.
68. See Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 1, at 399, 403. R
69. Mitchell, supra note 52. R
70. See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
71. Meyer, supra note 18, at 1190 (internal citation omitted). R
72. Id.
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According to this interpretation, then, the Clause “does no more
than prohibit the setting of excessive bail in cases prescribed baila-
ble . . . requir[ing] the legislation of Congress creating the right to
bail to lend it sustenance” and is “not self-executing.”73  Propo-
nents of this position point to the fact that the language of the
Clause does not explicitly create a right to bail74 and contrast this
ambiguity with the Judiciary Act of 1789’s clear provision for bail
in all noncapital cases:  clearly, they argue, the authors of the Bill
of Rights knew how to create a right to bail and could have done so
if they had so intended.75  Finally, as opponents of a constitutional
right to bail note, there cannot be an absolute right to bail—and
Congress is free to define which classes of cases should be baila-
ble76—since the Judiciary Act left bail decisions in capital cases to
judges’ discretion.77
2. The Argument that the Excessive Bail Clause Binds Both
Congress and the Courts and Grants a Right to Bail in
All Noncapital Cases
One version of this argument, made in dissenting opinions in
Carlson, is that the Excessive Bail Clause must imply a constitu-
tional right to bail by logical implication.78  According to Justice
Murton, “[t]he Amendment cannot well mean that, on the one
hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail so excessive in amount as
to be unattainable, yet, on the other hand, under like circum-
stances, it does not prohibit the denial of bail, which comes to the
same thing.”79
Similarly, Justice Black, while acknowledging that “the literal
language of the framers” may “lend[ ] itself to this weird, devitaliz-
ing interpretation when scrutinized with a hostile eye,” concluded
that reading the Excessive Bail Clause as “a limitation upon judges
only” would reduce it “below the level of a pious admonition.”80
In response to the argument for limitation only on judicial discre-
tion based on the function of the excessive bail clause in the En-
glish bail clause, Black notes, “[t]he Eighth Amendment is in the
73. Duker, supra note 8, at 86 (internal citations omitted). R
74. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1952).
75. See Meyer, supra note 18, at 1179. R
76. See Mitchell, supra note 52, at 1225; see also Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545. R
77. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3141 (2006)).
78. See Foote, supra note 3, at 970. R
79. Carlson, 542 U.S. at 569 (Murton, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 556 (Black, J., dissenting).
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American Bill of Rights of 1789, not the English Bill of Rights of
1689,” and that the American version was written to secure greater
rights than had been enjoyed in Europe.81  Developing the implica-
tions of this relatively non-controversial assertion further, Foote ar-
gues that “to construe the Eighth Amendment as not providing a
constitutional right to bail secure against legislative abridgement
flies in the face of everything we know about the purpose of the
Bill of Rights as a whole.”82
Black and Murton do not deal with the question of why the
Founders, if they intended to create a right to bail, failed to do so
more clearly.  Setting himself to this task, Foote suggests a histori-
cal accident.  He points out that George Mason, who authored
both the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the suggested constitu-
tional amendments from the Virginia ratifying committee, was not
a trained lawyer.83  Therefore, according to Foote, Mason, unlike
the lawyer author of the Northwest Ordinance,84 failed to appreci-
ate the structure of English bail law and so, thinking it unnecessary,
did not include an explicit right to bail in either document.85
Thereafter, “Mason’s mistake, if such it was,” was “carried forward
with so little discussion that the latent ambiguity of the clause was
never noticed.”86  Thus, according to Foote, the Excessive Bail
Clause was intended to convey the right to bail in noncapital cases
found in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and should be so interpreted.87
3. The Argument that the Excessive Bail Clause Binds Both
Congress and the Courts and Grants a Right to Bail
when Pretrial Imprisonment is not Necessary
for Effective Prosecution
The author of this position, Laurence Tribe, like Foote and
Black, starts by rejecting the Carlson position that the Excessive
Bail Clause limits only judicial discretion.  He bases this argument
on the grounds that though “an unlimited legislative power to de-
fine the boundaries of the citizen’s rights may be consistent enough
81. See id. at 557.
82. Foote, supra note 3, at 988. R
83. See id. at 984–85.
84. See discussion supra Part I.E.
85. See Foote, supra note 3, at 986. R
86. Id.
87. As Foote notes, however, there is no direct evidence to support this theory.
For him it is one part of a larger circumstantial argument based on the general trend
of English and American bail law at the time the Eighth Amendment was drafted as
well as the structure of the Bill of Rights. See id. at 989.
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with the English theory of civil liberties, in which Parliament is the
ultimate authority, such power would be totally inconsistent” with
the almost exclusive concern of the Bill of Rights with limiting con-
gressional powers.88  Further, he argues, such an interpretation
would “make no functional sense” because the governmental and
individual interests at stake are unchanged regardless of whether a
court or Congress is denying bail, and because the Due Process
Clause would “render the excessive bail clause superfluous” under
such a reading.89
Having thus concluded that the Eighth Amendment does convey
a right to bail, Tribe argues that the scope of this right must be
determined by “an examination of the contemporary purposes of
the clause,” since our “incomplete knowledge” of the history of
bail and the expectations of the Framers makes deducing the scope
of the right from history “exceedingly hazardous.”90  This contem-
porary purpose, Tribe argues, is the protection of the presumption
of innocence mentioned by the Court in Stack.91  This presumption
of innocence “represents a commitment to the proposition that a
man who stands accused of a crime is no less entitled than his ac-
cuser to freedom and respect as an innocent member of the com-
munity.”92  Therefore, Tribe concludes, the Excessive Bail Clause
prohibits “imprisonment that is not needed to effectuate the gov-
ernment’s interest in prosecuting [a defendant] to determine his
guilt or innocence.”93  This conception of the  right to bail, then, is
similar to that espoused by Foote, Black, and Murton (among
others), but specifically allows for detention to prevent the subver-
sion of the trial process through, for example, flight, intimidation of
the jury or witnesses, and destruction of evidence.94
These, then, were the three main interpretations of the Excessive
Bail Clause in the scholarly literature before the Supreme Court
addressed the issue directly for the first time as part of the constitu-
tional challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 in Salerno.
88. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 1, at 400 (internal citation omitted). R
89. Id. at 399–400.
90. Id. at 402.
91. 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
92. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention, supra note 1, at 404. R
93. Id. at 405.
94. Id. at 406 (internal citations omitted).
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III. THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
The history of federal bail legislation goes back to the Judiciary
Act of 1789, in which, as seen above, Congress mandated that bail
be granted to all defendants accused of noncapital crimes.95  This
remained the rule in all federal courts until 1970, when, at the urg-
ing of the Nixon administration, the national legislature altered the
law of the District of Columbia to allow the pretrial detention of
noncapital defendants on the grounds that their release would pose
a danger to the community.96  This law survived a constitutional
challenge in the District of Columbia courts,97 and, in 1982, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.98  Building off this success, Con-
gress passed the structurally similar Bail Reform Act of 198499
(“BRA”).
A. Alternatives to Detention
In its current form, the BRA first mandates that release on re-
cognizance be granted if the court finds no additional requirements
necessary to produce the defendant and protect public and individ-
ual safety:
The judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person
on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the court . . . unless
the judicial officer determines that such release will not reasona-
bly assure the appearance of the person as required or will en-
danger the safety of any other person or the community.100
When the court finds that a recognizance bond alone will not
“reasonably assure” that these objectives will be met, however, 18
U.S.C. § 3142(c) allows judges to not only require a monetary
surety,101 but also provides them with a long list of conditions they
can place on pretrial release.102
95. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3141 (2006)).
96. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 512 & n.3. R
97. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981).
98. United States v. Edwards, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
99. Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (2006).
100. Id. § 3142(b).
101. The sub rosa use of a monetary bond to deny bail is explicitly prohibited by
section 3142(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that
results in the pretrial detention of the person.”).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1).  These conditions include, among others, requiring
the defendant to:  remain in the custody of a third party; maintain or seek a job or
educational program; comply with restrictions on travel, living arrangements, and per-
sonal associations; avoid contact with the victim and witnesses; report to law enforce-
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In addition, the BRA authorizes judges to mandate “any other
condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of
the person as required and to assure the safety of any other person
and the community.”103  If the court does choose to set a financial
condition, under § 3142(c)(2) it may not “impose a financial condi-
tion that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”104  Courts
of appeal for at least two circuits have held that if the defendant
protests that the trial court has set bail higher than he can pay, the
trial court must provide a reasoned explanation for its arrival at the
disputed figure.105
B. Defendants Eligible for Pretrial Detention
A wide array of criminal defendants is eligible for detention
under the BRA.  The government may move for a detention hear-
ing in cases that involve:  (1) “a crime of violence” or certain
crimes of terrorism;106 (2) a charge punishable by death or life im-
prisonment; (3) a federal drug charge punishable by ten or more
years imprisonment; (4) any felony charge if the defendant has al-
ready been convicted of two or more crimes in the first three cate-
gories or comparable state and local offenses, or a combination
thereof; or (5) any felony that involves a minor victim or use of a
firearm or other dangerous weapon.107  In addition, both the gov-
ment or other designated authorities; obey a curfew; not possess weapons; not use
controlled substances or excessive alcohol; undergo medical or psychiatric treatment,
including institutional treatment; and remain in custody except for specified purposes,
such as work or school. Id.
103. Id.
104. This does not mean, however, that courts must set bail at an amount that de-
fendants can actually afford. See DAVID N. ADAIR, JR., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE
BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 3 (3d ed. 2006) (citing United States v. Mantecon-
Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550–51 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that section 3142(c)(2) prohibits
only “‘sub rosa use of money bond’ to detain defendants whom the court considers
dangerous”) (internal citations omitted)); see also United States v. McConnell, 842
F.2d 105, 108–10 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. Wong-Alvarez, 779 F.2d
583, 584 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 388–89
(1st Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810
(1st Cir. 1990).  As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Jessup, if the court sets bail at
the amount it finds necessary to assure the defendant’s appearance but which is
higher than the defendant can afford, the defendant will be detained “not because he
cannot raise the money, but because without the money, the risk of flight is too
great.” Jessup, 757 F.2d at 389.
105. See Jessup, 757 F.2d at 389 (citing Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d at 55); accord
McConnell, 842 F.2d at 110.
106. The list of terrorism-related crimes is found in 18 U.S.C.A § 2332b(g)(5)(B)
(West 2007).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) (2006).
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ernment and the court may move for a hearing if there is a serious
risk that the defendant will flee or threaten, intimidate, or injure
jurors or otherwise obstruct justice.108  If, after a hearing, the court
finds that its broad power to set conditions on release is, like a
recognizance bond, insufficient to reasonably assure the defen-
dant’s appearance and the safety of any other individual and the
community, the BRA requires that the court deny the defendant
bail or any other form of pretrial release.109  For the purposes of
the BRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) defines a “crime of violence” as:
(A) an offense that has an element of the offense the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the per-
son or property of another;
(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense; or
(C) any felony under chapter 109A, 110, or 117.110
This definition, which does not require that the illegal use (or
attempted or threatened use) of force rise to the level of a felony,
covers a broad swath of crimes.  As Professor Alschuler notes, the
BRA’s definition of crimes of violence “treats the use of force
against property no differently from the use of force against a per-
son; and if seizing a person is a crime of violence, perhaps lar-
ceny—seizing property—is a crime of violence as well.”111  No
matter how broad the definition is, however, the court must decide
whether the offense a defendant is charged with is a crime of vio-
lence by considering in the abstract the crime with which the defen-
dant is charged, rather than by examining the individual
circumstances of the defendant’s case.112
108. Id. § 3142(f)(2).
109. Id. § 3142(e).
110. Id. § 3156(a)(4).  Chapters 109A, 110, and 117 contain certain sexual offenses
involving children. Id. §§ 2241, 2251, 2421.
111. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 512 n.7.  As further evidence of the broad sweep of R
the BRA’s conception of crimes of violence, Alschuler cites United States v. Yeaple,
605 F. Supp. 85, 87 (M.D. Pa. 1985), in which the court held that possessing child
pornography might be a crime of violence, since creating the demand for such materi-
als indirectly leads to the violence (although arguably psychological rather than physi-
cal) done to the victims. See Yeaple, 605 F. Supp. at 87. But see United States v. Byrd,
969 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1992) (vacating detention order because receiving child
pornography “is not in and of itself a crime of violence”).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 432 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 2005).
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C. The Detention Decision
If a defendant is indeed eligible for detention under the BRA,
the court, after a hearing, must consider a multitude of factors in
determining whether to detain the defendant.  Once the court
grants the government’s motion for a detention hearing (which it
will as long as it finds that the case meets the statutory require-
ments) or moves for a hearing itself, the hearing must be held at
the defendant’s first appearance unless either the defendant or the
government requests a continuance.113  At the detention hearing,
the defendant has the right to counsel (and to appointed counsel),
to testify, present witnesses,114 cross-examine opposing witness,
and present information by proffer.115  The rules of evidence do
not apply, however.116  Further, when the government has chosen
to proceed by proffer, several circuits have held that, at least in the
absence of a specific proffer of how cross-examination might aid
the defendant, the court is not required to grant requests to sub-
poena government witnesses.117
After the hearing, the judicial officer must decide whether to or-
der the defendant detained before trial.  She must order detention
if she finds, by clear and convincing evidence,118 that no combina-
tion of the apparently limitless conditions she could set on the de-
fendant’s pretrial release would reasonably assure the defendant’s
presence at trial and the safety of individuals and the commu-
nity.119  In reaching this decision, the B.R.A. directs judicial of-
ficers to take into account the available information on the
following broad range of factors:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, includ-
ing whether the offense is a crime of violence, a Federal crime of
113. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006).  In United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711,
717 (1990), the Supreme Court held that “a failure to comply with the first appear-
ance requirement does not defeat the Government’s authority to seek detention of
the person charged.”  Thus, defendants may still be detained before trial if the gov-
ernment fails to comply with section 3142(f), although they may have “other reme-
dies.” Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 720-21.
114. The Third Circuit has held that a court may require the defendant to proceed
by proffer rather than by live testimony.  United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390,
1395-96 (3d Cir. 1985).  The Seventh Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclu-
sion in United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1991).
115. See § 3142(f).
116. See id.
117. See ADAIR, supra note 104, at 23 (citing United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d R
382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Winsor, 785 F.2d 755, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1986);
Delker, 757 F.2d at 1397-98).
118. § 3142(f).
119. See supra note 102. R
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terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance,
firearm, explosive, or destructive device;
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including –
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition,
family ties, employment, financial resources, length of resi-
dence in the community, community ties, past conduct, his-
tory relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history,120
and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the
person was on probation, on parole, or on other release
pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence
for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or
the community that would be posed by the person’s
release. . . .121
The BRA itself does not provide any guidance as to which, if
any, of these factors should carry the most weight; the Ninth Cir-
cuit has, however, stated that “the weight of the evidence is the
least important of the factors,”122 and the Seventh Circuit123 has
said that trial judges must not completely disregard any of them.124
Similarly, the BRA does not define danger; the legislative his-
tory does suggest, however, that Congress considers drug traffick-
ing dangerous to communities.125  The Third Circuit interprets the
danger factor as requiring a finding that the defendant is likely to
commit one of the crimes enumerated in § 3142(f),126 while the
Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, allows detention on the basis of
economic danger.127
In addition to these factors, the BRA creates rebuttable pre-
sumptions for a finding that no conditions of release could assure
120. The First Circuit has held that prior arrests not leading to conviction may be
considered as part of criminal history. See United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d
203, 209 (1st Cir. 1985).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006).
122. United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991).
123. United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1991).
124. ADAIR, supra note 104, at 7. R
125. See id. at 8 (citing S. REP. No. 98–225, at 12–13 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3195–96).
126. See id. at 8–9 (citing United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1986)).
127. See id. at 8 n.42 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 956 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1992))
(“[A] defendant convicted of mail fraud . . . posed an economic or pecuniary danger
to the community.”).
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the defendant’s appearance and the safety of the community for
two classes of defendants: (1) those who have, within the previous
five years, been convicted of or completed a prison sentence for a
crime committed while out on bail; and (2) those who the judicial
officer finds probable cause to believe have used a firearm to com-
mit federal drug offenses carrying a ten-year minimum penalty,
certain terrorism offenses, or certain sexual offenses involving
minors.128
D. Appeal
Appeal from pretrial detention is available, although the stan-
dard of review varies widely among the circuit courts of appeal.  If
the judicial officer orders a defendant into pretrial detention, she
must include written findings of fact and a statement of reasons for
the detention in her order.129  This order, if issued by a magistrate
judge, is subject to de novo review by the district court judge.130
Defendants may also seek review in the court of appeals, but here
there is a split among the circuits as to the appropriate standard of
review.  The Sixth,131 Seventh,132 Eighth,133 Ninth,134 Tenth,135 and
Eleventh136 Circuits are the most rigorous, and engage in de novo
review of the trial court’s decision while deferring to specific fac-
tual findings.  In contrast, the Second137 and Fourth138 Circuits,
which review for clear error, along with the Fifth Circuit, which will
uphold a trial court’s decision as long as “it is supported by the
proceedings below,”139  give the most credence to the trial court’s
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006).  This presumption shifts the burden of produc-
tion but not the burden of persuasion, although it still retains evidentiary weight after
the defendant has met his burden. See United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 798 (5th
Cir. 1989).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1) (2006).  The order must also include, among other
things, a directive that the defendant be held “to the extent practicable” separate
from convicted prisoners, id. § 3142(i)(2), and that the defendant “be afforded rea-
sonable opportunity for private consultation with counsel.” Id. § 3142(i)(3).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Reuben, 974 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992).
131. See United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985).
132. See United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1985).
133. See United States v. Cantu, 935 F.2d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 1991).
134. See United States v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 1990).
135. See United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 876 F.2d 826, 830 (10th Cir. 1989),
rev’d on other grounds, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990).
136. See United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1985).
137. See United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1995).
138. See United States v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
139. United States v. Aron, 904 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations
omitted).
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findings.  The First140 and Third141 Circuits fall in between, review-
ing the trial court’s decision independently, but with some
deference.142
IV. THE SALERNO COURT’S BAIL ANALYSIS AND SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LITERATURE
The BRA survived a constitutional challenge on due process and
Eighth Amendment grounds in United States v. Salerno.  As part of
his Excessive Bail Clause analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the Court, resolved 198 years of jurisprudential uncertainty by
rejecting any meaningful substantive right to bail and strongly sug-
gesting that the Clause applied only to the judiciary.  This section
will, after briefly providing the case’s factual and procedural back-
ground, examine the majority’s analysis along with Justice Mar-
shall’s dissent before concluding with a discussion of subsequent
developments in the scholarly literature.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In Salerno, the respondents, Anthony Salerno and Vincent
Cafaro, were charged with multiple RICO violations.  They were
denied bail after a hearing under the Bail Reform Act—in which
the government showed that the respondents were a “boss” and
“captain,” respectively, in an organized crime family—on the
grounds that no condition of release would assure the safety of the
community and any individual.143  On appeal, the Second Circuit
invalidated their detention on the grounds that the Bail Reform
Act was a facially unconstitutional violation of due process.144  The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and after finding no due process
violation,145 rejected the respondents’ Eighth Amendment
arguments.
140. See United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 813 (1st Cir. 1990).
141. See United States v. Traitz, 807 F.2d 322, 325 (3d Cir. 1986).
142. See ADAIR, supra note 104, at 35. R
143. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743 (1987).  Justice Marshall’s dissent
raises substantial doubts as to whether this “test case” sought by the government
presented a live case or controversy, since Salerno was convicted in a separate pro-
ceeding but allowed to remain free on bail pending the outcome of this case, while
Cafaro had been released on bail after agreeing to work as an informant for the gov-
ernment. See id. at 756–59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1986).
145. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745–52.
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B. The Majority’s Excessive Bail Clause Analysis
The respondents, basing their argument on the passage in Stack
v. Boyle in which the Court stated that “bail set at a figure higher
than an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant’s
presence at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment,”146
maintained that the Bail Reform Act violates the Excessive Bail
Clause because it “allows a court essentially to set bail at an infi-
nite amount for reasons not related to risk of flight.”147  This, as
discussed above, is essentially the position put forth by Laurence
Tribe, among others.148
Rehnquist rejects this argument, distinguishing Stack on the
grounds that it was concerned with the issue of whether bail, guar-
anteed to the defendant by statute, was set at an excessively high
level by the trial court.149  He then quotes Carlson at length for the
proposition that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit Con-
gress from determining which classes of cases shall be bailable, call-
ing that case “remarkably similar to the present action.”150  After
noting that Carlson was a civil case, however, Rehnquist stops
short of holding that the Excessive Bail Clause places no substan-
tive restrictions on Congress.  Instead, he concludes—without any
analysis—that since the Court would uphold the BRA under “[t]he
only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause[,] that the
Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be
‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil,” the Court does not have
to decide whether this lone possible substantive limit exists.151
Thus, under current law, if the Excessive Bail Clause creates any
right to bail at all, it is limited to situations in which the govern-
ment fails to put forth a sufficiently strong interest.  Since, as Pro-
fessor Alschuler notes, those arrested for “tipping over garbage
cans” are eligible for detention under the Bail Reform Act, the
scope of this possible substantive right would seem to be very
broad.152
146. Id. at 752 (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951)).
147. Id. at 752–53.
148. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
149. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753.
150. Id. at 753–54 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 529 (1952)).
151. Id. at 754.  The Court had already described the government’s interest in safe-
guarding the community and individuals as compelling. See id. at 753.
152. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 512. R
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C. Bail Clause Analysis in Marshall’s Dissent
In a very strongly worded dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, attacks the majority’s suggestion that the Exces-
sive Bail Clause limits only judicial discretion.  Pointing out the se-
lective nature of Rehnquist’s textualism, Marshall notes that “[t]he
text of the Amendment . . . provides absolutely no support for the
majority’s speculation that both courts and Congress are forbidden
to inflict cruel and unusual punishments, while only the courts are
forbidden to require excessive bail.”153  Countering the majority’s
argument from Carlson that the English Bill of Rights did not limit
the discretion of Parliament, Marshall, like Justice Black in that
case and Foote and Tribe after him,154 takes the position that the
U.S. Bill of Rights protects the “rights of the people against in-
fringement by the Legislature, and its provisions, whatever their
origins, are interpreted in relation to those purposes.”155
Having thus concluded, like Tribe, that the Eighth Amendment
limits the government’s powers of pretrial detention to those nec-
essary to prevent trial from being “evaded or obstructed,”156 Mar-
shall makes the argument that the language of the Amendment
logically implies a right to bail.  He declares that “it would be mere
sophistry” to argue that the Excessive Bail Clause prevents the
government from setting excessively high bail but not from refus-
ing to set bail at all, since “the consequences are
indistinguishable.”157
Marshall goes on to argue that the Excessive Bail Clause pro-
tects the presumption of innocence, and prohibits Congress from
furthering its interest in crime prevention and public safety through
detention before conviction.158  Otherwise, he argues, the govern-
ment’s power to punish and coerce before proving its case will be
too strong.  Noting that respondent Cafaro was originally detained
due to dangerousness and subsequently granted bail only after
agreeing to become a “covert agent” for the government, Marshall
argues that “[t]here could be no more eloquent demonstration of
153. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 761.  The majority states that “[n]othing in the text of the
Bail Clause limits permissible Government considerations solely to questions of
flight.” Id. at 754.
154. See discussion of Foote and Tribe’s arguments, supra Part II.C.2–3.
155. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 761 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 765.
157. Id. at 761.
158. See id. at 762–67.  Marshall quotes Stack for the proposition that bail is essen-
tial to the preservation of the presumption of innocence. See id. at 766 (quoting Stack
v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)).
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the coercive powers of authority” and its “almost inevitable
abuses” than the facts of the case itself.159
D. Subsequent Bail Scholarship
In the years since the Court’s decision in Salerno rendered the
Excessive Bail Clause a near nullity, there has been, perhaps not
surprisingly, relatively little written on the bail provision of the
Eighth Amendment.  What scholarship there is has generally either
taken up some combination of the arguments in Justice Marshall’s
Salerno dissent160 or accepted the majority’s interpretation and
abandoned the Clause as a meaningful source of law.161
One interesting if somewhat undeveloped exception is the work
of Laurence Claus.162 Claus, while focusing primarily on the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments,
argues that, based on the Amendment’s English origins in the po-
litically and religiously motivated abuses of the Stuarts,163 the pur-
pose of the Amendment is to “prohibit discriminatory
punishment.”164  Claus, therefore, would apply an Equal Protection
Clause analysis to determine whether the Eighth Amendment has
been violated.165 Although the Excessive Bail Clause gets little di-
rect consideration, Claus’s conclusions about the Eighth Amend-
ment presumably encompass its bail provision.
V. THE BAIL REFORM ACT AND THE HISTORIC PURPOSE AND
CORE PRINCIPLES OF THE EXCESSIVE BAIL CLAUSE
This Part argues that the Excessive Bail Clause, as interpreted in
Salerno, no longer serves its core purpose.  It analyzes the uncon-
stitutionality of the Act following a two step process.  First, the
meaning of the Excessive Bail Clause must be discovered, looking
to the historic abuses underlying the clause and the essential nature
of those abuses.  Second, it must be determined whether the Bail
159. Id. at 766–67.
160. See, e.g., Michael J. Eason, Case Note, United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095
(1987): Eighth Amendment—Pretrial Detention:  What Will Become of the Innocent?,
78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1048 (1988); Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent,
Feared Dangerous:  The Eighth Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 18-22
(2005).
161. See, e.g., Miller & Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 356. R
162. See Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth Amendment, 28 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2004).
163. See id. at 135–43.
164. See id. at 162.
165. See id.
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Reform Act’s preventive detention provisions—and the Court’s
decision in Salerno—square with these core principles.
In seeking to discern the purpose of—and the protections pro-
vided by—the Excessive Bail Clause by looking to its roots in the
abuses that inspired the Clause’s predecessor in the English Bill of
Rights and the founders’ decision to adopt the English text in
nearly unaltered form, the approach taken here resembles other
scholars’ purposive and historic theories of constitutional interpre-
tation and applies some of the principles underlying these theories
to the underdeveloped field of bail.166
166. This approach most closely resembles Professor Jed Rubenfeld’s “paradigm
case method” under an “Application Understanding” of the Constitution.  Rubenfeld
identifies two basic types of constitutional understandings:  “Application Understand-
ings,” wherein courts identify “specific understandings of what a constitutional right
prohibits,” and “No-Application Understandings,” which merely identify what a con-
stitutional right does not prohibit.  JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 14
(2005) [hereinafter RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION]. Under an “Application Understand-
ing,” courts identify the “paradigm case” that embodies the core prohibitions of a
constitutional right and the commitment embodied within the paradigm case. Id. at
15-19.  From this commitment, the courts “are to derive doctrinal rules” and apply
them “evenhandedly to subsequent cases.” JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME
190 (2001) [hereinafter RUBENFELD, FREEDOM].  The discussion in this Article also
has traces of Akhil Amar’s approach to constitutional interpretation, what he de-
scribes as “documentarian[ ] first, and doctrinalist[ ] second,” but it more strongly em-
phasizes the importance of using the historical context surrounding the writing and
adoption of constitutional provisions to understand their meaning and modern appli-
cation.  Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 27 (2000); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1182, 1185 (1991) (discussing the
“historical connection between the First and Eighth Amendments” and the latter’s
role in preventing judicial acquiescence in “government tyranny”); Akhil Reed Amar,
Our Forgotten Constitution:  A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286-89
(1987) (discussing the need to consider the “primary sources from the ratification
period,” which “comprise the People’s legislative history of the People’s law”).  Fi-
nally, my approach resembles portions of theories that look to the purposes for the
adoption of constitutional text at the time of its adoption. See, e.g., John Hart Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 929
(1973) (“Surely the Court is entitled, indeed I think it is obligated, to seek out the
sorts of evils the framers meant to combat and to move against their twentieth cen-
tury counterparts.”); Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82
YALE L.J. 227, 254, 256 (1972) (discussing how “constitutional rules are applications
of prior political law making” that  “reflect a series of decisions concerning the organ-
ization of government, its powers, and limitations that were made by particular men
at particular moments in history,” and emphasizing the importance of constitutional
interpretation as a “most serious inquiry into historic constitutional imperatives”).
My theory is both “originalist,” in its reliance on the historic context of a constitu-
tional provision, and “nonoriginalist” in its focus on the purpose of the original adop-
tion of the text—equitable treatment, for example—and the application of that
purpose to modern circumstances. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as
Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1628-29 (1989) (arguing that theories of
originalism and nonoriginalism intersect because “[t]hey seek the truths that the Con-
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\36-1\FUJ105.txt unknown Seq: 30 28-JAN-09 13:20
150 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI
The original motivation for the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against excessive bail is fairly clear.  As we have seen, that provi-
sion passed almost unchanged from the English Bill of Rights of
1689, through the Virginia Declaration of Rights, into the U.S. Bill
of Rights.167  The abuse it was originally drafted to cure was well
known to the Founders168: the effective denial of pretrial release169
by the King and his judges to keep imprisoned his (or their) politi-
cal and religious enemies, and, as seen in Darnel’s Case,170 to force
these enemies to capitulate to his demands.
The protection of criminal defendants against those abuses, then,
was the immediate purpose of the Excessive Bail Clause, but the
analysis does not end there.  To avoid an overly limited under-
standing of the Clause, we must inquire further:  why was the effec-
tive denial of bail (for indeed, hollow semantic quibbles aside, the
Stuart judges were denying bail) to the King’s targets so abhorrent
to the Founders and their English forebears?171  What was the core
of the problem they sought to address?
stitution conveys to us” and that “[t]here is a close connection between the no-
noriginalist notion that the Constitution should be viewed as a charter establishing
justice, and the originalist notion that the Constitution must be interpreted to advance
the fundamental principles and values of the framers and ratifiers”).  Solum uses New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan as an example, where the “nonoriginalist” Brennan drew
“on the framers’ and ratifiers’ understanding of the freedom of speech, crystallized by
the Alien and Sedition Acts, in order to take us back to the fundamental aspiration or
central meaning of the first amendment,” a view “recognized by the conservative pro-
ponents of originalism.” Id. at 1628 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964)); see also Edwin Meese, The Battle for the Constitution, 35 POL’Y REV. 32
(1985).
167. See discussion supra Part I.D.
168. See RAWLE, supra note 54, and accompanying text; Meyer, supra note 18, at R
1190 (“The men who made the United States Constitution were familiar with English
law and English legal history.”); see also discussion supra Part III.A.
169. See SCHWOERER, supra note 16, at 90 (“[J]udges evaded [Habeas Corpus’] R
purpose by setting bail so high that the prisoner was unable to raise the sum, in effect,
denying him the right to bail.”).
170. See discussion supra Part I.A.
171. See RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 166, at 25–26 (“[R]easoning from R
paradigm cases has to offer an explanation of why the paradigm cases are paradigm
cases:  what was it about the [paradigmatic abuses] that made them core violations?”);
see also Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230, 234 (1988) (dis-
cussing how judges interpreting the Constitution must “apply the rules of the written
constitution in the sense in which those rules were understood by the people who en-
acted them” and arguing that the constitution’s “force derives from the historical and
political events surrounding its creation and the regard in which those events were
and continue to be held”); Laurence Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges
or Immunities Revival Portend the Future – or Reveal the Structure of the Present? 113
HARV. L. REV. 110, 121 (1999) (discussing, in a more recent historic analysis,
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I suggest that the answer is that bail was being denied for rea-
sons the drafters of the Clause thought illegitimate:  political, relig-
ious, or personal reasons.  Contrasting these practices with the
standard bail procedure of the time illustrates the “paradig-
matic”172 nature of this arbitrary, discriminatory173 abuse:  gener-
ally, the legislature decided whether whole classes of defendants
were bailable—based on perceived risk of flight,174 dangerous-
ness,175 or whatever other broadly applicable reason—on the basis
of the crimes of which they were accused, and the judges176 would
neutrally apply these criteria.177  Thus, the bail charged by the Stu-
art judges was “excessive” not in relation to the King’s interests,
but because Parliament judged those individualized interests to be
illegitimate, and the sums demanded could not be justified by any
rule of broad applicability.  The great wrong the Stuart judges com-
mitted and that the Excessive Bail Clause prevented, then, is that
they denied bail to defendants—personally, discriminatorily—
based on who they were (used broadly to encompass beliefs, as-
sociations, or unwillingness to conform to the King’s extralegal de-
mands) rather than—impersonally, impartially—on what they were
accused of doing.178
The purpose embodied in the text of Excessive Bail Clause,
therefore, is to prevent discrimination in pretrial detention by re-
quiring that the decision whether or not to grant bail be made with-
out consideration of individual characteristics, even if they might
be, in a literal sense, relevant to the decision.179  In short, then, it
“[p]aradigmatic examples of government practices that evoked the brand of equal
protection strict scrutiny”).
172. See RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION, supra note 166, at 25. R
173. See Claus, supra note 162, at 138. R
174. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *297 (explaining the pre-
sumption against bail for capital defendants: “For what is there a man might not be
induced to forfeit, to save his own life?”).
175. See, e.g., HIGHMORE, supra note 27, at vii (noting that Parliament created the R
presumption against bail for capital defendants so “that the safety of the people
should be preserved against the lawless depredations of atrocious offenders”), quoted
in Alschuler, supra note 5, at 550. R
176. The term “judges” is used broadly here to include justices of the peace and
other bail-granting officers.
177. See Statute of Westminster, supra note 7. R
178. Cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 82 (1998) (“More so than the
takings clause, most other provisions of Amendments V–VIII were centrally con-
cerned with the agency problem––the danger that government officials might attempt
to rule in their own self-interest at the expense of their constituents’ sentiments and
liberty.”).
179. The fact that Jenkes was calling for a new Parliament was apparently quite
relevant to the government’s decision to deny him bail.
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grants criminal defendants the right to blind justice in detention
decisions.  This is a commitment not only to antidiscrimination in
bail in the broad sense as described by Professor Claus,180 but also,
more specifically to non-tyrannical criminal procedure181:  prevent-
ing the government from discriminating against a class of people
from whom the government wants something—by using the threat
of pretrial detention (or the reward of bail)—to coerce defendants
to capitulate to its demands, whether to give the King a loan as in
Darnel, to stop agitating for a new Parliament as in Jenkes, or to
become a government informant, as in Salerno.182
This protection against coercion and discrimination, as I have de-
scribed it, cannot be applicable only to the judiciary.  Not only
would such an interpretation be generally inconsistent, as many
have noted, with the principles of constitutional analysis,183 but
would specifically fail to honor the core principles of the Eighth
Amendment:  the abuses of the Stuart judges would not, by any
reasonable measure, be somehow more palatable if authorized
against Catholics and Royalists by a rogue Parliament.
Before examining whether the BRA is consistent with the broad
purposes of the Eighth Amendment, a pair of possible objections.
First, someone might object, courts consider personal characteris-
tics—financial, familial, residential—all the time when setting bail,
and have done so since before the passage of the English Bill of
Rights.  How can this be consistent with a prohibition against bas-
ing bail decisions on who people are?  The response is simple: it is
quite appropriate for judges to consider these characteristics when
deciding on the quantum of bail to demand—indeed, the proper
functioning of the bail system requires that they do so.  It is only
when the decision not to grant bail at all is based on personal de-
tails that the Excessive Bail Clause is violated.  Note, however, that
this does not mean a court necessarily violates the Excessive Bail
Clause when it sets bail at a level higher than a defendant can af-
ford.  It may be that the amount necessary to secure appearance at
180. See Claus, supra note 162. R
181. See AMAR, supra note 178, at 82 (the Constitution aimed to prevent govern- R
ment’s interference with “constituents’ sentiments and liberty”); Jed Rubenfeld, The
End of Privacy,  61 STAN. L. REV. 102 (2008).
182. Cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 766–67 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (finding that the power of government to imprison on prediction is coercive).
The line between antidiscrimination and anti-coercion is often indistinct.  If the King
is locking up Protestants because he dislikes Protestants, this may not be entirely aim-
less:  he may be trying to coerce people into abandoning Protestantism.
183. See, e.g., id. at 761; see also discussion supra Parts II.C.2–3, IV.C.
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or non-obstruction of trial is greater than that which the defendant
can raise.184
The second objection might appear more serious:  how is the
practice—found in both England in 1689 and the United States in
1789—of allowing judges broad discretion to grant bail or not in
capital cases consistent with the Eight Amendment’s core princi-
ples of antidiscrimination and anti-coercion?  The response is two-
fold.  At the outset, it may be worth noting explicitly that these
principles do not grant a right to bail in all cases:  the legislature
may, consistent with making bail decisions without reference to
personal characteristics, deny bail to all armed robbers, for exam-
ple, because it considers them to be flight risks or because the dan-
ger of allowing the guilty ones out on the street outweighs the
interests of the class (including the innocent) in pretrial liberty.185
With that in mind, the fact that Parliament and, later, Congress
chose, while creating a presumption against bail for capital of-
fenses, to create a safety valve of judicial discretion in an age when
jail conditions were frequently appalling186 does not conflict with
antidiscriminatory principles:  any discrimination by the judges
could have no worse result than the detention the legislature pre-
sumed was the correct decision.
The second and perhaps more important response to this objec-
tion187 is that the discretion delegated to judges in capital cases was
not unbounded: as Professor Alschuler convincingly argues, these
decisions were to be made on the strength of the proof against the
defendant.  The default was no bail, but, as Highmore explains, bail
was “regularly to be allowed in such cases wherein it seems doubt-
ful whether the person accused be guilty or not.”188  This practice
was embodied not only in the Pennsylvania Frame of Government
184. See discussion supra Part III.A.  It may be of little comfort to the defendant so
denied bail to know that his Eighth Amendment rights are being respected, but his
complaint is more properly addressed to the bail system as a whole than at the inter-
pretation of the Excessive Bail Clause put forth here.
185. Of course, if Congress were to deny bail to all suspects, there would be a likely
due process violation.
186. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 174, at *300 (“[G]aolers . . . are frequently a R
merciless race of men, and, by being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against
any tender sensation.”).
187. A third response would be that judicial discretion in capital cases represents a
Non-Application Understanding and can therefore be disregarded as being a mere
intention.
188. HIGHMORE, supra note 27, at 152 (emphasis omitted), quoted in Alschuler, R
supra note 5, at 555. R
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of 1682,189 which predates the English Bill of Rights, but also the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which requires judges to consider “the na-
ture and circumstances of the offense, and of the evidence, and the
usages of law” when exercising their discretion in capital cases.190
Evaluating the strength of the evidence against a defendant does
not require any knowledge or consideration of his personal charac-
teristics:  it concerns, rather, what a defendant is accused of and not
who he is as a person.  It does not, therefore, open the door to use
of the bail system for political purposes.
To recapitulate before moving on, I have argued that the core
purpose of the Excessive Bail Clause was the prevention of the
abuse and manipulation of the bail system by the Stuart Kings and
their royal judges and that that provision requires that courts avoid
discrimination in decisions to grant bail by prohibiting the consid-
eration of defendants’ personal characteristics—those factors, that
is, concerned with who defendants are as individuals, rather than
the generic, interchangeable fact that they are accused of a particu-
lar sort of crime.  Finally, then, we can consider whether the BRA
is consistent with this purpose.
A. Antidiscrimination, Anti-Coercion, and the Bail Reform
Act of 1984
As the reader may have guessed, the BRA’s pretrial detention
procedures would be clearly impermissible under the Excessive
Bail Clause as analyzed above.  As an initial matter, there is, under
this view, no Eighth Amendment problem with Congress detaining
whole classes of defendants to prevent jury tampering or to protect
society from the danger of having the guilty among them at large
before trial.191  Thus, for example, if the BRA simply denied bail to
all defendants currently eligible for a detention hearing under
§ 3142(f),192 those defendants would all be treated equally and im-
personally, and the antidiscrimination and anti-coercion principles
would not be violated.
189. Frame of Government of Pennsylvania, at Laws Agreed Upon in England, art.
XI, reprinted in 5 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES 3052, 3061 (1909).
190. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3141 (2006)).
191. There may well, of course, be a due process problem.  Or perhaps, according
to the Supreme Court, there would not. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745–52 (1987).
192. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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Detention for dangerousness in the BRA, however, is not ad-
ministered impartially to whole classes of defendants.  Nor is it,
like flight risk, a necessarily individualized factor in the setting of
bail.  Rather, dangerousness in the BRA is an individual criterion
for denying bail and is therefore prohibited by the antidiscrimina-
tion and anti-coercion principles set forth above.  Thus the BRA
directs judges to do exactly what the Excessive Bail Clause was
designed to forbid:  decide whether to grant bail based on defend-
ants’ personal attributes, such as their “character, physical and
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources,
length of residence in the community, community ties, past con-
duct, [and] history relating to drug or alcohol abuse,” along with
their “history and characteristics” generally.193  While these factors
may be appropriate when considering how much bail will be neces-
sary to ensure the defendant’s appearance, they, along with the ex-
ceptionally vague “nature and seriousness of the danger to any
person or the community that would be posed” by release factor,194
are not appropriate for determining the threshold question of
whether or not to consider granting bail to a defendant.
Because they are different and less likely to arouse the sympathy
or understanding of prosecutors and judges, those outside the
mainstream of society—the unemployed, those belonging to orga-
nizations the government considers suspect, and those with ideas
outlandish enough to cause their mental condition to be ques-
tioned—are precisely the people most in need of blind justice.  The
Framers, with their knowledge of English history, understood this.
But far from observing the protections embodied in the Excessive
Bail Clause, the BRA instead overtly encourages, or perhaps de-
mands, explicit bail discrimination against “outsiders.”  This dis-
crimination has far reaching consequences:  the ability of extended
pre-trial detention to induce guilty pleas—thus augmenting the
government’s ability to incarcerate suspects without a trial to test
the strength of its case—is well established.195
In addition, of course, the vagueness of the personal characteris-
tics factors generally and the dangerousness factor in particular al-
lows a tremendous amount of latitude for racial and other types of
193. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2006); see discussion supra Part III.C.
194. § 3142(g).
195. See, e.g., HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 220–27 (1982)
(discussing the ability of judges and prosecutors to induce guilty pleas from detained
defendants through a time-served plea—this effect is presumably strengthened by the
BRA, which makes pretrial detention more common).
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clearly prohibited discrimination; with a laundry list of vague fac-
tors to choose from, any reasonably competent judge or prosecutor
would be able to justify the detention of almost any defendant
while disguising his real motives—and there is reason to believe
the government has taken advantage.196  With the ability to
strongly influence the pre-trial process, as Justice Marshall noted in
his Salerno dissent,197  the government is well-positioned under the
BRA to use, both openly and covertly, the threat of detention or
the reward of bail to coerce its targets.  The ability of a judge to
delve into the most private areas of one’s life while making a bail
determination may, like other activities that encourage govern-
ment “omniscience,” be “one of the most effective tools of tyr-
anny,” grand or petty.198
CONCLUSION
Since the 1984 Bail Reform Act, the number of pretrial deten-
tions has, as might be expected, risen steadily.  In 1984, prior to its
passage, 26% of federal defendants were detained prior to trial.199
Between January and June of 1986, approximately 31% of criminal
defendants were detained prior to trial under the Act.200  From Oc-
tober 1, 2002, to September 30, 2003, 64% of the 83,419 defendants
with cases beginning in that year were detained prior to trial.201
Examining the history of the Excessive Bail Clause and its cen-
tral purpose, this Article has argued that many of these deten-
tions—along with the Bail Reform Act of 1984 itself—are
unconstitutional because they are based on the consideration of ex-
actly the sort of individual characteristics to which the Eighth
Amendment demands we be blind.
The interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court (building on
the Carlson dictum202) when upholding the BRA in Salerno cannot
196. See, e.g., Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction:  A Return to a Fuzzy Model
of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 376 (1994) (finding a disproportionate
increase of Hispanic defendants detained under the BRA).
197. See discussion supra Part IV.C.
198. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963).
199. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL BAIL:  HOW BAIL REFORM IS
WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS 3, 8 (1987), available at http://archive.gao.
gov/d29t5/134489.pdf (investigating cases from January through June, 1984).
200. Id. at 8, 15.
201. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003, at 42, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/cfjs0303.pdf.
202. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.  In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952),
where alien communists were denied bail before a deportation hearing because the
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be justified under any meaningful approach that recognizes the
Amendment’s historic grounding in anti-coercive and anti-discrimi-
natory principles.  The “only arguable substantive limitation” the
Salerno Court could imagine in the Excessive Bail Clause—“that
the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not
be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil”—will not prevent the
specific abuse the Clause was adopted to prevent:  denial of bail
seems quite reasonable when considered in light of a governmental
interest in obtaining essential war funds203 or preventing the dis-
ruption of government.204  Using the bail process to punish individ-
uals for actions believed to run counter to these interests is
acceptable under the Salerno standard yet violates the Clause’s
core principles.
The detention criteria of the Bail Reform Act permit, and per-
haps encourage, judges and prosecutors to allow government dis-
crimination and coercion in pretrial detention decisions.  Though
not yet prophetic, Justice Marshall’s description of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Salerno is wholly merited:  “[t]heirs is truly a
decision which will go forth without authority, and come back with-
out respect.”205
A renewed discussion of the Bail Reform Act is necessary, both
in the literature and Congressional and judicial decisionmaking, to
revive the most basic protections of the Excessive Bail Clause.
Congress must develop principles that allow adequate public pro-
tection but prevent bail decisions based on discretionary determi-
nations of an individual’s character, determinations which allow
the government, consciously or unconsciously, to punish those de-
fendants who (non-criminally) fail to conform.  Absent thorough
reconsideration of the unlimited and unconstitutional discretion
authorized in the Act, the detention criteria of the Bail Reform
Act will continue to allow, and perhaps encourage, judges and
prosecutors to violate the Founders’ prohibition against govern-
ment discrimination and coercion in pretrial detention decisions.
Attorney General believed communists and their ideas were dangerous, is certainly
wrongly decided under the Excessive Bail Clause as analyzed here.
203. See discussion of Darnel’s Case, supra Part I.A.
204. See discussion of Jenkes’s Case, supra Part I.B.
205. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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